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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MALDONADO V. AM. AIRLINES: EXPERT VOCATIONAL 
TESTIMONY IS NOT PER SE REQUIRED IN JUDICIAL 
REVIEW PROCEEDINGS TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION 
OF CORRECTNESS OF A WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION A WARD OF "OTHER CASES" INDUSTRIAL 
LOSS. 
By: Stephen Cornelius 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there is no per se 
requirement to present expert vocational testimony to rebut the 
presumption of correctness of a Workers' Compensation Commission 
award of "Other Cases" industrial loss. Maldonado v. Am. Airlines, 
405 Md. 467, 952 A.2d 294 (2008). An exception exists, however, 
when the factors of industrial loss are so complicated that no jury 
could justifiably alter the Commission's decision without hearing 
expert testimony. Id. at 480, 952 A.2d at 302. 
George Maldonado ("Maldonado") was a fleet service clerk 
employed by American Airlines ("American"). Maldonado suffered a 
tear in his back while loading luggage into an aircraft carrier. He filed 
for workers' compensation benefits, claiming that he could not return 
to work because he could only sit for a limited period of time before 
needing to lie down. The Workers' Compensation Commission ("the 
Commission") determined that Maldonado sustained permanent partial 
disability of 50% from physical and psychological injuries. 
American sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County. At trial, Maldonado testified that, following his 
injury, he obtained a bachelor's degree in theology, performed light 
housework, could walk continuously for thirty to forty minutes, and 
could drive a car. Additionally, both parties presented expert medical 
testimony addressing the severity of Maldonado's injuries. The jury, 
without hearing expert vocational testimony, reduced Maldonado's 
overall impairment to 35%. Maldonado appealed, and the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that there is no per se 
requirement for expert vocational testimony in a judicial review 
proceeding to rebut the Commission's presumption of correctness. 
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Maldonado then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted. 
To determine the necessity of expert vocational testimony in 
judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
commenced its analysis with the explanation that a Commission's 
decision is presumed correct, and that the challenging party has the 
burden of proof. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 477,952 A.2d at 301 (citing 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b) (West 2008». The court 
explained that no particular type of evidence is required to overcome 
the presumption of correctness; the challenging party can overcome 
the presumption by introducing new evidence, by relying on the record 
before the Commission, by contesting the significance of evidence, 
and by arguing witness credibility. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 478, 952 
A.2d at 301 (citing Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 245 Md. 433, 437, 
226 A.2d 253, 256 (1967». The court held that while vocational 
expert testimony is admissible, vocational analysis has never been 
elevated to a sine qua non for proving permanent disability. 
Maldonado, 405 Md. at 479-80,952 A.2d at 302 (citing Terumo Med. 
Corp. v. Greenway, 171 Md. App. 617, 639, 911 A.2d 888, 900 
(2006». 
The court analyzed "Other Cases" industrial loss as a category of 
permanent partial disability under section 9-627(k) of the Labor and 
Employment Article of the Maryland Code. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 
475-77, 952 A.2d at 299-300. The court found that two factors must 
be addressed: (1) the nature of the physical disability, and (2) the age, 
experience, occupation, and training of the disabled employee at the 
time of the injury. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-
627(k)(2) (West 2008». Expert vocational testimony is not per se 
required in every case, except when these two factors "are so 
complicated that no jury in any case, regardless of the other evidence 
presented, would have sufficient evidence upon which to alter a 
Commission decision." Maldonado, 405 Md. at 480,952 A.2d at 302. 
Maldonado asserted that the facts surrounding his injury were too 
complex for a jury to assess the extent of his injury without the help of 
a vocational expert. Id. at 474, 952 A.2d at 299. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland disagreed, concluding that Maldonado's testimony, 
coupled with the expert medical testimony, provided sufficient 
evidence as to each factor under section 9-627(k)(2) for the jury to 
alter the Commission's decision. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 482-83, 952 
A.2d at 303-04. 
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The court found the first factor adequately addressed at trial. Jd at 
482-83, 952 A.2d at 304. Medical experts addressed the severity of 
Maldonado's physical and psychological injuries, and Maldonado 
testified that after the injury, he earned a degree and performed 
everyday activities such as working around the house and driving a 
car. Jd. While expert medical testimony is mandated to establish the 
nature of an injury in a complex case, the court emphasized that it was 
not necessary for every subjective injury claim. Jd at 479,952 A.2d at 
302 (citing Jewel Tea Co. v. Blamhle, 227 Md. 1, 7, 174 A.2d 764, 767 
(1961». 
The court also determined that the trial sufficiently addressed the 
second factor. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 482, 952 A.2d at 303. First, 
Maldonado testified to the length of his employment, the physical 
nature of his position as a fleet service clerk, and the fact that he was 
forty-three years old at the time of the accident. Id. The court found 
that this testimony effectively addressed the statutory components of 
the second factor. Id. at 482-83, 952 A.2d at 303-04. Second, the 
court explained that jurors are generally familiar with matters 
involving work, age, experience, training, and job prospects. Id. at 
481,952 A.2d at 303. Consequently, the court concluded that the jury 
could determine, without a vocational expert, the extent of 
Maldonado's injury and how it affected his ability to work. Jd. at 483, 
952 A.2d at 304. 
Despite the court's statutory analysis, Maldonado, relying on case 
law, argued that industrial loss determinations were inherently 
complicated, necessitating expert vocational testimony. Id. at 479,952 
A.2d at 301. In dismissing this argument, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland noted that the case Maldonado relied on "explicitly stated 
that [it was] not establishing a per se requirement for expert testimony 
when a medical question was involved." Jd at 479, 952 A.2d at302 
(citing Jewel Tea, 227 Md. at 7, 174 A.2d at 767). Further, Jewel Tea 
required expert testimony because the challenging employee's lay 
testimony directly conflicted with all expert medical testimony, 
including his own expert's testimony. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 479, 
952 A.2d at 301 (citing Jewel Tea, 227 Md. at 7, 174 A.2d at 767). 
The court noted that several other states have also held that expert 
vocational testimony is not a sine qua non for determining industrial 
loss. Maldonado, 405 Md. at 481, 952 A.2d at 303. The court pointed 
out that, of the jurisdictions that purport to require expert vocational 
testimony, none of them apply a per se rule across the board. Id. at 
481-82, 952 A.2d at 303. 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland eliminated any uncertainty 
pertaining to a requirement of expert vocational testimony in judicial 
review proceedings for workers' compensation claims. The 
challenging party may produce any type of evidence so long as they 
satisfy the burden of proof. This approach promotes judicial economy 
because it conserves time in situations where a lay person can easily 
discern the extent of an injury and how it affects wage earning 
capacity. By holding that expert vocational testimony is not per se 
required to rebut the presumption of correctness of a Commission's 
award of permanent partial disability, the court empowers challenging 
parties with discretion in satisfying the burden of proof in judicial 
review proceedings. 
